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14 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Personnel

FROM : Commanding Officer, [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT : Recommendations to Improve Agency Military Reserve Program

REFERENCE : Memorandum to AD/P from [REDACTED]
dated 7 May 1954

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I have gone over very carefully the above cited memorandum and concur in the recommendations of the Staff Study. There seems to me also to be considerable merit in the suggestion made by the Air Force (Annex F, pages 3 and 4) concerning establishment of "Mobilization Assignee Units." In a sense, such a system might serve as a part solution to the problem of a CIA Reserve which we have discussed on a number of occasions.

In further reference to Annex F, I feel the section dealing with the Marine Corps Reserve does not perhaps adequately represent the top level attitude of the Corps. When this question of inequities in the status of Reserve Officers in CIA first came up, I discussed the matter in considerable detail with Major General John C. McQueen, Director of Reserve USMC, and Colonel William Stickney, Marine Corps Representative on the Department of Defense Reserve Policy Board. Both General McQueen and Colonel Stickney indicated that there would be no difficulty in working out an arrangement with the Corps whereby Reserve Officers could be credited with a "satisfactory year" on proper certification by the Agency that their CIA duty assignment precluded their fulfilling normal Reserve responsibilities. This credit would of course be contingent upon the Reserve Officer having demonstrated in the past his willingness to perform such Reserve duty. Headquarters, Marine Corps has been extraordinarily cooperative in supporting the Reserve Unit in the Agency and I am sure that General McQueen would be more than willing to go along with any appropriate arrangement that the Agency might suggest. If there is any assistance that I can give in this connection, I would of course be more than happy to do so.

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7 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Personnel

SUBJECT: CIA Civilian Reserve Problems

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To determine what action, if any, should be taken by the Director of Central Intelligence, or other appropriate authority, to improve conditions relative to members of the reserve components of the Armed Forces who are employed by CIA, with a view toward maximum benefit and equity to (a) the Armed Forces and CIA, and (b) the personnel involved.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

A. To discharge assigned commitments under conditions of national emergency the DCI must control the assignment of his civilian-reservists (civilian employees having reserve status with the Armed Forces) upon mobilization.

B. Agency mobilizations plans will provide for an additional active duty military contribution by the Armed Forces to CIA in excess of total numbers of civilian-reservists now, or anticipated to be, employed by CIA.

C. CIA civilian-reservists should not be subject to discrimination in participation in reserve affairs, or benefits therefrom, solely by virtue of their employment with this Agency.

D. CIA civilian-reservists would elect to be assigned to an Agency associated reserve unit, if the benefits to be derived therefrom were not appreciably less than those accruing to members of non-Agency associated reserve units.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. The following conditions of non-uniformity characterize CIA's reserve problem (see Annex "A"):

1. Some CIA civilian-reservists are members of CIA reserve units, some are members of other units, and some are not members of any unit.

2. Benefits to individual members derived from Agency reserve units vary according to the service concerned:

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a. Army: Mobilization Designation Unit, provides 12 pay drills, 15 days active duty per year with pay to each member.

b. Air Force: Air Reserve Squadron, provides no drill pay, 15 days active duty per year with pay to approximately 7 per cent of membership.

c. Navy: Composite Company, provides no drill pay, only two lowest commissioned ranks usually receive 15 days active duty per year with pay, subject to availability of funds; does provide 15 days active duty without pay per year.

d. Marines: Volunteer Training Unit, provides no drill pay, 15 days active duty per year with pay to each member.

B. The only major condition of uniformity characterizing CIA's reserve problem is the difficulty or impossibility of accomplishment of a "satisfactory" (50 points to qualify for retirement), or even a "good" (27 points to retain active reserve status) year by CIA civilian-reservists (See annex B)

C. Approximately 2,000 Agency employees (1,500 commissioned, 500 enlisted) possess some degree of reserve status. Of this total, only about 25 per cent are members of Agency-associated reserve units. (See Annex C)

D. Previous attempts to solve the problem have met with limited success, and appear not to have been exploited to their full potential. (See Annex D)

E. CIA's peacetime reserve problem cannot be intelligently considered separately from Agency war mobilization plans.

F. Certain senior officials of the Agency hold junior military rank. The recall of these officials to active military duty at their current military rank would create serious command and protocol problems. (See Annex E)

G. Less than 5 per cent of Agency personnel who have enlisted reserve status are assigned to Agency-associated reserve units. Of approximately 500 enlisted reservists, 200 are Army, and no provision currently exists for their assignment to the Agency Army Reserve Detachment. Provision does exist for the assignment of the remaining reservists to the other reserve units.

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Exploratory discussions with members of the Armed Forces concerned with reserve affairs shows, in general, a sympathetic understanding of CIA reserve problems. Navy has the most restrictive policy on using money for reserve affairs. (See Annex F)

B. It is mandatory that the Agency develop mobilization plans. Failure to submit realistic mobilization requirements to the Armed Forces mitigates against the solution of CIA's reserve problem.

C. Based on an analysis of the above facts and assumptions it is felt that the minimum acceptable revision of present CIA arrangements with the Armed Forces for the conduct of the CIA reserve program should include:

1. Sufficient reserve slots and proper grade distribution to allow assignment of all civilian-reservists; manner of assignment to be predicated upon location and sensitivity of employee's duties.

2. Co-equal advantage accruing to members of the several reserve components, to include, where physically and operationally possible:

- a. Twelve pay drills per year.

- b. Eligibility for 15 days active duty with pay per year.

- c. Consideration for promotion.

3. In those cases where location or sensitivity prevents active reserve participation (attendance at drills and active duty tours) provision for maintenance of active reserve status and consideration for promotion.

D. It is believed these minimum acceptable standards can be accomplished, under three conditions of civilian employment status, by the following means:

1. Headquarters (Washington) Personnel:

- a. Increase the authorized size of the Army Mobilization Detachment to approximately 650 officers and 150 enlisted personnel, with a grade table of distribution sufficient to allow assignment of Army reservists at grades presently held plus promotional flexibility; allocation of sufficient funds for drill and active duty purposes.

b. Obtain agreement from other services to allot sufficient funds for drill and active duty pay (This would probably have the effect of converting all reserve units to "Mobilization Designation" units).

2. Foreign Field Duty:

a. It is not considered desirable for Agency civilian-reservists to associate themselves with any overt reserve facility existing in occupied areas abroad for the following reasons:

(1) Their prior assignment, if such be the case, to a Washington Headquarters CIA reserve unit would be disclosed upon transfer of their records to the reserve unit abroad.

(2) Their interest, if not association with, intelligence matters would in many cases be disclosed by their records showing military occupational serial numbers in the intelligence field.



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b. It is suggested that the four services establish additional reserve units, at the strength stated below, to which all foreign-stationed reservists will be assigned:

(1) Army: 150 officers and 30 enlisted personnel.

(2) Navy: 100 officers and 100 enlisted men.

(3) Marines: 20 officers and 10 enlisted men.

(4) Air Force: 10 officers and 10 enlisted men.


c. It is believed that arrangements can be effected with the Armed Forces whereby reservists stationed abroad can be assigned to these units for carrying purposes.

d. Department of the Army Special Regulation No. 140-350-20, "Army Reserve--Training Projects" (Annex G), says in part:

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"Heads of other governmental agencies having USAR mobilization designations will be responsible for preparing and processing training projects for their mobilization designees in accordance with these regulations."

Based on the above delegation of authority, it is believed an Agency Army reserve training program could be developed which, at the least, would make overseas personnel eligible for consideration for promotion. Similar arrangements with the other services would be desirable.



E. Adequate and effective CIA associated reserve units are definitely to the advantage of the Armed Forces. —

1. CIA civilian-reservists when called to active duty would be credited as part of the Armed Forces contribution to CIA augmentation upon mobilization. —

2. An adequate CIA reserve program makes available to the Armed Forces a pool of intelligence specialists to serve for short active duty periods to instruct or to perform other specialized duty with the Armed Forces. —

3. With the undoubted close association between the Armed Forces and CIA in the event of a national emergency, it is of considerable value to the Armed Forces to have among CIA's employees personnel who are kept current on the policies and procedures of the Armed Forces. —

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4. When CIA civilian-reservists terminate their CIA affiliation, they are then available for mobilization designation by their service, and are of greatest value to their service if they have been kept current in their training through an adequate CIA reserve program. Additionally, CIA service itself generally enhances the military value of the individual.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. The DCI must control the assignment of Agency civilian-reservists upon mobilization.

B. The correction of deficiencies in the Agency reserve program will be greatly aided by the early establishment of mobilization requirements on the Armed Forces.

C. All CIA reservists called to active duty should be chargeable against our mobilization requirements on the Armed Forces.

D. The quantitative level of CIA reserve units should be established at the approximate level of the number of Agency civilian-reservists.

E. To protect the interests of civilian-reservists serving in a covert capacity, consideration should be given to obtaining:

1. Specific reserve units, headquartered in Washington, to which employees on foreign assignments [REDACTED] will be assigned.

2. Approval for the DCI to establish with all services documented or non-documented projects such as are provided in the Army through SR 140-350-20.

F. [REDACTED] employees should be attached to local reserve units for paid drill and active duty purposes.

G. Sub-units of Headquarters reserve units, preferably a single composite unit, should be established [REDACTED]

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Agency mobilization requirements on the Armed Forces should be determined at the earliest possible date. ✓

B. Authorization should be requested from the Armed Forces to establish mobilization designation units at the level of the approximate number of civilian-reservists, by service, currently on duty. ?

C. Agreement should be had with the Armed Forces that:

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1. The DCI controls the mobilization assignment of members of Agency reserve units.

2. Those members called to active duty will be credited to CIA mobilization requirements on the Armed Forces.

D. Applicability of Army Special Regulation 140-350-20 to covert civilian-reservists should be studied, and approval for a similar plan sought from the other services.

E. Separate reserve units administered by Headquarters should be established to carry and administer civilian personnel assigned to overseas [REDACTED] duties.

F. Authority should be sought for assigning [REDACTED] employees to Headquarters reserve units and attaching them to local reserve units for pay drill and active duty purposes.

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Approved:

Assistant Director for Personnel

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Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-01129R000100100014-7

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ANNEX B--PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN MAINTAINING
ACTIVE RESERVE STATUS

An analysis of the several types of employment status and duty assignments within the Agency that work to the prejudice of the individual reservist disclose the following to be the most typical. It should be remembered that these situations also work to the prejudice of the Agency, because they prohibit the assignment of the individual reservist to a unit clearly under the control of DCI:

a. Staff employees or agents assigned to overseas posts of duty, under official or non-official cover, are not allowed to continue assignment to any current reserve unit identified with CIA. The nature of their true assignment with CIA, and in many cases the nature of their operational duties, preclude their assignment to local reserve units in existence in the major military theaters abroad, e.g., [REDACTED]

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CIA reserve units because of inability to attend drills, etc. Certain of these individuals hold individual mobilization assignments to CIA, and such assignments preclude their active association (pay drills, active duty tours) with reserve units in their local area.

To illustrate the above inequities there are recorded selected case histories which are typical of the various categories:

a. Staff employee who was an active member while in Headquarters of a CIA reserve unit; had completed ten years of active military service. Transferred to foreign field station, and because of cover considerations, was denied permission to participate in reserve training or take military correspondence courses. Result of inactivity forced his transfer to inactive status and denial of promotion opportunity.

b. Staff agent serving under non-official cover in small Latin American republic. Had no access to storage of classified material and could not subscribe to certain correspondence courses. Had been assigned to CIA reserve unit while in Headquarters. After one and a half years overseas was transferred to inactive reserve.

c. Staff employee serving abroad under official cover. Had been active member of CIA reserve unit while in Headquarters but was involuntarily transferred to inactive reserve while abroad. Upon return to Headquarters, he could not again be assigned to CIA reserve unit because there were no vacancies at his grade level.

d. A USNR (Wave) Officer, employed by Agency since 1949, was not eligible for assignment to a CIA reserve unit until September 1953 because:

(1) Served overseas [REDACTED] from 1949-1950 and could not participate in reserve activity.

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(2) Was paid from unvouchered funds for year 1950 in Washington, and was prevented for security reasons from being associated with CIA reserve unit.

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f. Staff employee with record of active participation in reserve affairs prior to overseas assignment. Upon arrival at overseas post was ordered, for operational reasons, to assume status of [REDACTED]. Such assumed status prevented any connection with reserve program. Subject eventually was transferred to inactive reserve status, and has been unable to date for lack of explanation acceptable to proper Army reserve units officials, to be reinstated to active reserve status.

ANNEX C--STATISTICAL SURVEY OF MILITARY RESERVISTS
ON DUTY IN CIA AS OF 31 MARCH 1953

The report quoted below was compiled by the Assistant Director/Personnel at the request of the author of this staff study, and grateful acknowledgement is hereby made.

It is believed certain additional explanatory material on the preparation of these statistics is in order to insure their correct interpretation:

25X9 a. Paragraph II of the report below states that [redacted] (or [redacted] of Agency Staff Employee and Agent Strength) Qualification Questionnaires were analyzed, and [redacted] showed military reserve status. However, of this [redacted] stated their reserve rank. Therefore, Office of Personnel statisticians made two projections:

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25X9 1. The ratio of reservists found in the study of the [redacted] Qualification Questionnaires was applied to the total Agency staff strength, with the resultant estimate that there are [redacted] reservists in CIA.

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25X9 2. A rank-distribution ratio was determined on these [redacted] cases where rank was declared. This ratio was then applied to the estimated total of [redacted] reservists to compile the summary of ranks held by reservists.

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b. Included among the 28 per cent of employees on whom Qualification Questionnaires were not available was at least one Brigadier General. It is not known at this time how many other reserve (not retired) officers of flag or general rank may also be civilian employees. A more detailed study of the entire statistical problem has been undertaken by AD/Pers.

I. PURPOSE. The purpose of this statistical survey is to determine: (1) the number of CIA Staff Employee and Staff Agent Military Reservists on duty, (2) the rank and the service component of each reservist, (3) the ratio of domestic vs overseas reservists, and (4) the attrition rate within the military reservist category.

II. PROCEDURE

25X9 A. A total of [redacted] Staff Employee Qualification Questionnaires were analyzed to determine their Military Reserve Status. The [redacted] Staff Employees represented approximately [redacted] of the Agency's Staff Employee and Staff Agent on duty strength.

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B. Of the [redacted] Questionnaires analyzed ([redacted] of the Agency strength), a total of [redacted] or approximately [redacted] per cent showed military reserve status in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or National Guard.

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C. Based on the assumption that the [redacted] sample survey presents a sufficiently representative sample on which to base coverage for the remaining 28 per cent not surveyed, an additional [redacted] reservists may be added to the [redacted] reservists referred to in paragraph B above. Accordingly, the military reserve strength of CIA as of 31 March 1954 is estimated to be [redacted] reservists.

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D. The attrition rate of CIA re-employable military reservists could not be accurately determined as of the time of this survey due to the fact that the re-employable register of separated employees was not established in the Agency until early 1953. The attrition experience factor during this period is not sufficiently representative to permit valid reservist re-employable attrition rates. However, the Office of Personnel does maintain accurate attrition rates for the Agency strength as a whole including attrition rates for each civilian grade level and/or grade groupings. Lacking recorded evidence to the contrary, this paper assumes that for general planning purposes, the attrition rate for reservists and non-reservists is relatively comparable.

III. Based on assumptions and qualifications outlined in paragraph II above, the following statistical computations have been prepared:

1. Summary of CIA Reservists indicating Service Component, Officers vs enlisted, and domestic vs overseas assignment status. (Attachment A)
2. Summary of CIA Reservists categorized by rank and Service (Attachment B)
3. CIA attrition rates within selected grade groupings. (Attachment C)

IV. It should be recognized that the reservists strength as indicated in attachments hereto are probably maximum figures since reservist elections and DOD selective processes under the provisions of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 are not fully reflected in this statistical survey.

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ANNEX D--PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR
CIA RESERVISTS IN COVERT CAPACITIES

Negotiations were carried on with the various armed services during 1948-49 to insure that covert employees of CIA would retain reserve status. It was recommended that those reservists who had been involuntarily put on the inactive list be restored to the active reserve upon presentation of certificates signed by the DCI. Results were as follows:

1. Army indicated general concurrence on 27 October 1949.
2. Navy suggested an alternate solution on 8 October 1949.
3. Air Force concurred and indicated willingness to grant 150 points per year of covert service (this was later reduced to 50 points per year in accordance with Public Law 810 in 1949).

A letter from the DCI to Secretary of Defense, dated 17 November 1949, recommended that policy be prescribed by the Department of Defense covering reserve personnel of each of the armed services employed by CIA in covert capacities to provide:

1. Full restoration of active reserve status without loss of prior rights.
2. Minimum point credits for reserve retirement purposes.

The above was answered by a letter dated 6 June 1950 from the Civilian Components Policy Board of the Office of the Secretary of Defense as follows:

1. Existing agreements of the Military Departments provide means of securing retention in the active reserve without requirement to participate in reserve duty training.
2. Only 15 points per year for membership in the active reserve can be awarded without active participation in reserve training.

This information was disseminated to Agency components by the Acting Executive on 20 June 1950, with the instruction that certificates signed by DCI would no longer be necessary for restoration of reserve status; notice by the individual of his return to the U.S. would be sufficient.

A short history of the attempt to establish a joint CIA reserve unit in [REDACTED] follows.

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ANNEX E--DISPARITY BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY GRADES

A study of the current military reserve problem in CIA discloses that in a sizable number of cases there exists a great disparity between the civilian (GS) rating of senior officials and their military reserve rank. These disparities are such that if the aforementioned officials were called to active military service with this Agency and maintained their present positions of responsibility, serious command and protocol problems would present themselves. While there is no identifiable pattern that brings about the above-stated conditions, the following facts, in many cases, have a bearing on the matter:

1. Many individuals holding positions of responsibility today have had consecutive service since OSS. Their service with OSS was in an active duty military capacity, and upon separation they were hired in a civilian capacity by SSU or CIQ. They were separated from the military at junior or medium level rank.

2. Such individuals have demonstrated their operational and/or administrative ability in the ensuing nine years and have advanced themselves to senior civilian status.

3. In the process of conscientiously discharging their assigned Agency duties, they did not have sufficient time to participate in military reserve activities so as to insure military advancement comparable with the development of their civilian careers.

4. By the nature of their Agency employment, many of these individuals were prohibited from participating in reserve affairs.

The matter has been further complicated by the Agency hiring from time to time individuals for specific positions who held senior military rank, either in the reserves or before retiring from active regular service. Many of these individuals were hired for staff positions, or to fill critical vacancies, and find themselves, at senior military rank, serving under the command of younger men with junior military reserve status.

Recommendations on how this problem may be ameliorated are not considered germane to subject study; it is considered in order, however, to present the problem for consideration.

There follows a listing of actual examples of the disparity of military rank that would exist in components of the Agency if assigned reserve or retired officers assumed active duty status at rank presently held, and maintained positions of current responsibility:

1. Deputy Director/Plans

Chief of Operations is Lieutenant Commander, USNR; serving as chiefs of immediate or senior operational staffs are one Brigadier General, two Colonels, and one Lieutenant Colonel. There are innumerable civilians subordinate to Chief of Operations who hold superior military ranks.

It is estimated that a substantial percentage of Senior Representatives abroad have held flag or general officer rank while members of the regular service.

2. Deputy Director/Administration

Acting Deputy Director/Administration is a combat-retired Colonel of the Regular Army. Serving under him, as Auditor-in-Chief, is a retired Major General of the Regular Army. Under conditions of mobilization, it is conceivable that both could be restored to the active duty list.

3. Deputy Director/Intelligence

Incumbent of position of Deputy Director/Intelligence is Colonel, USAR; one member each of the Board of National Estimates is flag rank and General Officer; additional retired General Officers serve in DD/I.

In the Office of Operations, under DD/I, the following disparity of military rank exists:

AD/OO is Colonel, USAFR; Chief, Contact Division is Lieutenant Commander, USNR; Chief, [REDACTED] Office, is retired Rear Admiral, USN([REDACTED]) is brigadier General, USAR.

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ANNEX F--DISCUSSIONS WITH SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES

1. Department of Defense

25X1A A Discussion of CIA's Reserve Problems was held on 29 April 1954 between [REDACTED] of CIA and Major John M. Ford of the Manpower and Personnel Division, Office of Secretary of Defense, Reserve Branch.

Major Ford stated that the civilian personnel of the Office of Secretary of Defense apparently had much the same problem as CIA. For example, Washington Reserve employees of OSD are not granted drill pay by the Air Force at the present time. This was confirmed in a subsequent conversation with Col. Paul J. Tempske of the Reserve Activities Group in the Air Force.

Major Ford is presently conducting a study of his own in an effort to try to do for the Office of Secretary of Defense the same thing that the CIA Group is now trying to do for CIA.

He furnished a copy of Department of Defense Directive No. 1230.1 dated 3 December 1952, "Standardization of Emoluments for Reserve Forces Officers Assigned to the Selective Service System for Training." Major Ford stated that he felt both the Office of Secretary of Defense and CIA might very well model their requirements along the same lines as the Selective Service System, since in both cases personnel need to have their mobilization designations with their present parent unit and are, as a general rule, more vital to their assignment in the event of war.

The Selective Service System plan authorizes all of their reserve forces officers whatever branch, Army, Navy, or Air Force, to be in Training Pay Group A (48 pay drills and 15 days active duty per year).

Major Ford stated permission of a sovereign country is required for any United States Reserve Officer to take training in that sovereign country. He said that Reservists may keep themselves in good standing by being members of the United States Reserve Unit abroad. These units exist only in posts which have a regular troop basis, usually in occupied areas. Other Reservists may take correspondence courses or set up training programs or training projects under military attaches. Major Ford said all of these methods are being used to some degree by the Office of Secretary of Defense at the present time.

2. Army

25X1A A discussion of CIA's Reserve Problems was held on 27 April 1954 between [REDACTED] of CIA and Lt. Col. E.E. Hyde, Management Branch, Reserve Components Division, Office of G-1, United States Army.

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Col. Hyde made the following points and observations:

In those cases of CIA personnel who by reason of their assignment are unable to be active in the reserve, it is quite easy to prevent transfer of these individuals to inactive reserve. They can be handled in the same manner as Congressmen are presently handled, to the effect they are on a mission for the U.S. Government or an agency thereof and in a capacity which prevents them from attending drills, taking correspondence courses, or taking active duty. Under this situation, however, Col. Hyde pointed out it would not be possible for the individual to maintain a "satisfactory" year (50 points) so that he would be able to prepare himself for promotion. He could only make a "good" year (27 points) which protects him from automatic transfer to the inactive Reserve.

It is not possible to give a blanket certification of "appropriate duty" performance by covert Central Intelligence Agency personnel, thus providing the individual with 50 to 65 points. Col. Hyde did point out, however, that it might be possible to certify these cases after the fact.

He suggested as a means for certifying these cases, providing appropriate agreements can be worked out between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of the Army, that CIA might set up a Board of Officers, at least one of whom would not be a CIA employee, or would not be assigned to CIA. This Board of Officers would review the man's accomplishment for the past year and determine whether or not he should be qualified and, therefore, certified for minimum non-active duty points (50-65). He suggested that this one officer who is not a member of CIA might very well be from the Technical Training Branch of G-2 of the Army, and that he could very easily be submitted to CIA security clearance. He would be the only non-CIA person witting of the actual duties performed by this covert person.

25X1A [REDACTED] suggested that there might be a possibility of convening a CIA Board, at least one of whom would be a member of the Regular Army on duty with CIA. This Board would review the actual performance of the individual and recommend to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a member of the Regular Military Establishment. The DDCI, in turn, might be given authority by the Secretary of Defense or other appropriate authority to approve the proceedings of this Board to the effect that the man could then be certified as having performed appropriate duties for the year in question and then would be awarded a "satisfactory" year. Col. Hyde expressed the opinion that such a plan might be worked out. It would be subject, of course, to an agreement between the DCI and the appropriate Secretary.

The general attitude of Col. Hyde toward the problem can be interpreted from his remark: "We can work this out, I believe. It will take some doing, but I believe it can be taken care of."

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Col. Hyde indicated that one of the possibilities might be to set up the CIA person's duties under SR 140-350-20 which permits the establishment of documented projects. He said that this regulation might be adapted to include non-documented projects which might very well include certain types of duties performed by CIA personnel.

In reply to a query as to what the Department of Defense did about its civilian employees overseas who are members of the Reserve Units, Col. Hyde said that this is handled by Attachments to United States Army Reserve Schools generally near areas where troops have been stationed. In other cases, he said, such civilian personnel keep themselves current by using correspondence courses and others (in limited amounts) by special work with the Military Attache. The latter, he says, must be worked out on an individual basis with, and at the discretion of, the Military Attache.

Col. Hyde suggested that we send an informal memorandum, stating our problem and how we desire to cope with it, to the Secretary of the Army, with information copies to G-3 Training and the Reserve Components Division of G-1.

3. Air Force

A discussion of CIA's Reserve problems was held on 29 April 1954 between Lt. Col. Paul J. Tempske, Acting Chief of the Reserve Activities Group, DCS/P, USAF, and Major W.J. Rogers, Chief of the Ready and Standby Reserve Branch, and [REDACTED] CIA.

The over-all problem of persons employed by CIA who are members of the Air Force Reserve was discussed both in terms of its present situation and in terms of the possible future situation.

Regarding the future situation, Col. Tempske expressed the opinion that the Air Force Reserve personnel in CIA should be considered mobilization designees to CIA and a part of the Air Force's commitment to support CIA in an event of an all-out mobilization. Under those conditions, he felt that the Air Force would approve the redesignation of present Volunteer Air Reserve Training Unit to a mobilization designee unit. Such a unit gets no drill pay but each member does get two weeks active duty per year. The present VARTU does not get any drill pay and gets only its proportionate share of active duty billets during the year. Throughout the particular area in which this Unit is now located, the CIA Unit did receive its proportionate share this current year but for all VARTU units there was less than 10 per cent of the personnel assigned who could be ordered to active duty; in the case of the local unit this would mean around nine or ten officers would be given active duty slots.

In discussing a possible future situation, Major Rogers and Col. Tempske both recommended that the Air Force could have mobilization assignee units throughout the Continental limits which would be non-CIA employees but whose mobilization assignment would be CIA. They felt

that this would be the best possible solution to meeting the Air Force obligation to CIA in the event of an all-out mobilization. Mobilization assignees are in training pay group C (12 pay drills per year and 15 days active duty).

It was further suggested that the immediate problem, of course, was the local unit, that the secondary problem of mobilization assignees to fulfill manpower obligations could very well be handled at a later date, and in any event could not be handled until CIA could tell the Air Force how many people it wanted, in what grades, and with what skills. Having this information, the Air Force then could make their mobilization plan fit these particular requirements and could organize and recruit to fulfill mobilization assignee units.

It was also suggested that these mobilization assignees might take their two weeks active duty each year with CIA. It was further suggested that the mobilization designees (the converted present [REDACTED] in CIA) could take active duty under the Directorate of Intelligence.

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Col. Tempske suggested what he thought CIA might best do in this case would be a one-shot composite letter from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Secretary of Defense outlining Army, Navy, and Air Force problems in one group. Major Rogers said it appeared to him that the establishment of mobilization assignee units to fulfill mobilization requirements and the establishment of mobilization designee units within CIA to protect the reserve status of CIA employees would be the most satisfactory solution of the Air Force's contribution to CIA in event of mobilization.

4. Navy

A discussion of CIA's Reserve Problems was held on 30 April 1954 between [REDACTED] of CIA and Captain William Hughes, Office of the Director of Naval Reserve.

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Captain Hughes says he believes the present system being offered for Naval reserve officers who are civilian employees in the Central Intelligence Agency is, under existing budgetary plans, the best that can be offered. He said that presently any Naval Reserve officer in CIA in the United States can get Naval training every year without pay and that he has the facilities available to attend adequate drills per year in order to qualify for his 50 points each year. On a pay basis, the lower grades, particularly ensigns and jg's, for the large part are able to get active duty every year. For the higher grades, they are able to get two weeks active duty with pay only about once every four years, but non-pay active duty is available to any Naval Reserve officer in Washington.

Captain Hughes said to change the basic policy for CIA would require making the same change in other agencies, such as the State Department, in order to be fair across the board to all agencies.

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He said that the fundamental reason for the Navy policy in this matter was the unusual requirements of the Navy, vis-a-vis Army and Air Force, for enlisted support in the event of mobilization, pointing out the excessive requirements for training technicians in enlisted grades particularly in the Navy. He said that the Army and the Air Force both have National Guard units which can furnish the bulk of this particular grade in the event of an all-out mobilization. He therefore characterized the Navy policy as a concentration of reserve funds towards operational needs of the Navy and consequently said that the bulk of these reserve funds were expended for ship's complement type training which included both officers and enlisted men.

Captain Hughes said that limited training was available to Reservists in occupied areas, and in countries where training is permitted by treaty agreement. Treaties presently exist only with the Philippines and Japan.

Naval Reserve personnel on civilian duty in sovereign countries may take active duty if a Fleet unit is nearby, boarding a U.S. Man-o-War for such duty.

Documented projects are not available to Naval personnel, and Captain Hughes said efforts to establish such a procedure had been resisted. He cited an example of a University group in the Mount Everest vicinity. A Naval Reserve member of the group sought approval of a project to make meteorological observations. The application was denied.

Captain Hughes said that a special board of naval officers is now studying the entire reserve program of the Navy and that if a memorandum of CIA's interest in the matter were forwarded to him he would see that it would be placed before this Board for its considerations.

5. Marines

A discussion of CIA's Reserve Problems was held on 30 April 1954 between [REDACTED] of CIA and Lt. Col. L.D. Spurlock, Assistant Director and Officer in Charge of the Recruiting Branch, and Lt. Col. William Patrone, Officer in Charge of the Reserve Branch, Fifth District, United States Marine Corps.

Col. Spurlock and Col. Patrone both feel that the present arrangements with CIA's Reserve Unit are adequate and meet the necessary requirements. There is no limit to the number of officers out of the Washington Unit who may take two weeks active duty each year. They stated that any Marine Reserve officer in CIA in the U.S. could presently have two weeks active duty each year on request. There is no funding arrangement available for any pay drills during the year.

The overseas problem is approximately the same as that of the Navy.

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6. Selective Service

A discussion of CIA's Reserve Problems was held on 30 April 1954 between [REDACTED] of CIA and Col. George A. Irvin, Chief, Field Division, Selective Service System, and three of his subordinate officers, Col. Snow, Col. Engle, and Col. Averill.

Col. Irvin stated that while Department of Defense Directive #1230.1 of 3 December 1952 permitted the Selective Service System to have Reserve Units of civilian personnel now employed by the Selective Service System on a full training-pay Group A basis (48 paid drills, 15 days active duty), that in fact the Selective Service System did not avail themselves of this arrangement insofar as their civilian personnel are concerned.

He pointed out that this provision was not used by reason of a decision of the Selective Service System itself. The Selective Service System reasons that if an individual is qualified as a Reserve Officer and as a civilian employee, they simply call him to active duty as a Reserve Officer and put him to work for Selective Service in uniform. This applies both in peace and in war.

A considerable conversation was had in the operation of the Reserve Units of the Selective Service System for the purpose of augmentation in the event of all-out mobilization. This is made the subject of a separate Memorandum of Conversation.

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*SR 140-350-20

SPECIAL REGULATIONS }
No. 140-350-20

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 4 November 1952

ARMY RESERVE TRAINING PROJECTS

Effective 1 January 1953

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1. **Purpose.**—These regulations provide for—
 - a. Training which may be made available to mobilization designees who are not members of mobilization designation detachments, and scientists and specialists (including semiprofessional or administrative specialists) for whom no other appropriate training exists.
 - b. Training of selected individual reservists other than those in *a* above who are unable to participate in appropriate inactive duty training by reason of their geographical location or for other cogent reasons.
 - c. The effective utilization of the specialized capabilities of selected reservists not included in *a* or *b* above.
2. **Governing provisions.**—Procedures set forth in SR 140-190-2 and SR 140-190-3, as they pertain to training projects for personnel in the Army Reserve Research and Development Program and the Army Reserve Military Intelligence Program, will govern.
3. **Scope.**—Training projects are limited to one or more of the following general areas for individual reservists only.
 - a. Those of value to the assignee.
 - b. Those which will be of benefit to part or all of the Department of Defense.
 - c. Technical studies for which a military need exists.
4. **Definition.**—The terms used herein are as defined in AR 140-305.
5. **Responsibility for preparation, processing, and assignment.**—
 - a. Heads of Department of the Army agencies; Chief, Army Field Forces; and area commanders for whom USAR mobilization designations have been approved are responsible for preparing and assigning such training projects as may be necessary to provide the training not otherwise available to their mobilization designees, in order to

*These regulations supersede SR 140-350-20, 25 May 1950.

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insure that they attain and maintain the required standards of proficiency. Heads of other governmental agencies having USAR mobilization designations will be responsible for preparing and processing training projects for their mobilization designees in accordance with these regulations.

b. Army agencies desiring to utilize individual specialized capabilities of selected reservists, as authorized in paragraph 1, whose training will better prepare the individual for mobilization, will be responsible for preparing such projects and processing them in accordance with paragraph 6.

c. Individual reservists eligible under provisions of paragraph 1 may initiate requests for projects by forwarding an outline of desired project or requesting any appropriate project by subject only through channels to the Chief, Army Field Forces. The Chief, Army Field Forces, will consult with appropriate proponent agency before approving or disapproving the request. If the request for a project is approved, the Chief, Army Field Forces, will assign its supervision and further processing as prescribed in paragraph 6 to an appropriate Army agency which will then be considered the initiating agency.

d. Heads of all agencies preparing and assigning training projects will subdivide the over-all project into increments which normally could be expected to be accomplished in 3 months or less, in order to permit the award of credit for a completed project or increment thereof to coincide with the end of the retirement year for the individual or individuals concerned. No retirement point credits will be awarded for less than a completed phase or increment of a project.

6. Method of processing.—a. Heads of agencies initiating training projects will forward them to the Chief, Army Field Forces, for review and assignment before any work upon the project is accomplished. A letter of transmittal will accompany each project and will include the following information.—

- (1) Name, grade, service number, and complete address of the individual to whom the project is to be assigned.
- (2) The individual's unit of assignment and mobilization designation. If not a mobilization designee, this fact will be indicated.
- (3) The estimated number of hours required to complete the project.
- (4) When appropriate authorization of the individual to correspond direct with the initiating agency on technical aspects of the project.

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b. If training projects received by the Chief, Army Field Forces, do not meet minimum training standards indicated in paragraph 3, they will be returned with appropriate comment to the initiating agency. When approved by the Chief, Army Field Forces, training projects will be processed as follows:

(1) Training projects for assignment to Department of the Army mobilization designees.

(a) Forwarded through channels to the reservist.

(b) Upon completion, the training project will be returned through the appropriate unit instructor and military district headquarters to area command headquarters, where it will be reviewed. If deemed satisfactory, the appropriate number of retirement points will be authorized for the individual concerned, based upon one point for a minimum period of 2 hours in one day or one point for lesser accumulated periods which total 2 hours on different days when it is impracticable to perform such duties otherwise. Not more than one point may be credited in any one day. When it is considered impossible to properly evaluate the completed project, points will not be awarded until the Chief, Army Field Forces makes final determination of credit. The completed project then will be returned direct to the initiating agency.

(2) Training projects for assignment to individuals other than those specified in (1) above.

(a) Forwarded to appropriate area commander for approval and assignment to the designed individual.

(b) The completed project will be processed as indicated in (1)(b) above.

(3) Training projects other than those authorized herein may be authorized by the Chief, Army Field Forces, who will effect the necessary coordination in individual cases or groups of cases with interested Army agencies.

c. Any training project involving reservists residing in foreign countries in other than United States occupation zones will be processed in the same manner as Army Extension Course material within the provision of SR 350-300-5.

7. **When accomplished.**—Work on projects assigned to individuals will not be performed during training assemblies or during periods of equivalent training or appropriate duties for which retirement credit is authorized.

8. **Pay.**—Inactive duty training pay is not authorized for training projects described in these regulations.

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

OFFICIAL:

WM. E. BERGIN
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

J. LAWTON COLLINS
Chief of Staff, United States Army

DISTRIBUTION:

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952